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Abstract 
 
This paper considers the nature and the distribution of trade and FDI effects of a potential 
enlargement of the European Monetary Union (EMU) to the ten countries that obtained EU 
membership in 2004. Intuitively, the implementation of a single currency for these countries 
means replacing several fluctuating currencies by a common currency. This gives rise to both 
“level” and “risk” effects of reduced currency movements on trade and investment. Another 
factor is the nature of the link between trade and FDI. This is also important not only because 
cross-border factor flows are becoming increasingly important, but also the international trade 
literature has long recognized that cross-border factor flows and trade in goods and services 
can be substitutes or complements. Given this background, one-way and two-way error 
component gravity models are estimated to examine for these theoretical expectations within 
a dataset of unbalanced panel data that combines bilateral trade flows among 29 countries and 
the distribution of outward FDI stocks among these countries (including the 10 new EU 
members). The data generally cover the period from 1990 to 2004. Our empirical results 
convincingly support: (i) a complementarity between trade and investment, (ii) a relationship 
between trade and exchange rate volatility that depends on the sign of bilateral trade balances, 
(iii) a positive effect of EU on trade and investment, and (iv) a positive effect of EMU on 
foreign investment. Using a simulation-based technique, we find that estimates of FDI effects 
of EMU range between 18.5 percent for Poland and 30 percent for Hungary. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Accession Treaty of the European Union (EU) that entered into force on May 1, 2004 
accredited the accession of ten new countries into the EU. This represented the biggest 
enlargement in European integration with more than 100 million citizens joining the EU1. 
Economic and political changes came dramatically fast in these countries as they, excepting 
Cyprus and Malta, adjusted from planned to market economies in 15 years. The next step in 
the integration process is to join the European Monetary Union (EMU) 2. On the one hand, the 
prospect of euro membership helps stabilize these economies and the effective adoption of the 
euro as a common currency would generate the microeconomic benefits of a currency union. 
On the other hand, membership would imply the loss of macroeconomic flexibility of running 
an independent monetary policy. Hence, the question of what constitutes the benefits of EMU 
accession for new member countries assumes considerable importance. 
 
An important factor affecting firms’ foreign trade and investment decisions is the volatility in 
the major currencies of the world as illustrated by the behavior of the US dollar in the last two 
decades. Central to the issue is the popular conjecture that the floating exchange rate regime 
has led to a decrease in the volume of trade and in the investment flows by multinational 
firms. This view has been put forward repeatedly by governments and international 
organizations (see for example, UNCTAD, 1993, pp.224, Table XI.2). This paper examines 
the empirical premises of such conjecture. 
 
Foreign direct investments (FDI) have grown dramatically as a major form of international 
capital transfer over the last few decades. Between 1990 and 2005 world stocks of FDI have 
approximately quintupled. The emerging global economy is one increasingly dominated by 
multinational firms that contribute to the internationalization of production chains. Currently 
they account for about one-third of world trade, intra-firm trade constituting the major 
component of such trade flows. One of the important features of FDI is that it is prominent in 
industries where the classical competitive paradigm fits least well. Regarding the ten new EU 
members a characteristic of the data is that they lag behind in attracting FDI as evidenced by 
UNCTAD’s FDI performance index. The latter computes the ratio of a country’s share in 
global FDI inflows to its share in global GDP. An index value of 1 implies the equality of 
                                                 
1 The ten countries that became EU member in 2004 are: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Slovenia joined the EMU on January 1, 2007. 
2 The European Monetary Union (EMU) exists since January 1, 1999 and comprises 12 countries. It 
substituted the euro for the national currencies of Austria, Belgium, France, Finland, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Greece joined the EMU on January 1, 2001. 
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both shares. In 2005, estimates range between 0.04 for Estonia to 0.92 for Slovenia 
(UNCTAD, 2006, Annex Table A.I.9). Therefore, the question of what can be the role of 
EMU in the trans-boundary investment behavior of enterprises becomes important for these 
countries. 
 
The analysis of this paper considers variables such as trade and foreign direct investment, 
which are closely linked to the exchange rate. To that end, we estimate gravity models based 
on a dataset of unbalanced panel data that consists of bilateral trade flows among 29 countries 
and of the distribution of outward FDI stocks among these countries (including the ten new 
EU members). The data generally cover the period from 1990 to 2004, thus including the 
2004 EU membership of the new countries. Whereas the existing literature aims at measuring 
the general effects of a common currency on trade (see e.g. Rose, 2004) or FDI (see e.g. De 
Sousa and Lochard, 2006; Petroulas, 2007), the contribution of the paper is to assess the 
implications of EMU enlargement for each individual country. These implications rest on the 
empirical tests of key propositions from the theoretical literature on the relationship between 
trade and FDI and on the role of exchange rate volatility on trade and investment. Our 
empirical results convincingly support: (i) a complementarity between trade and investment, 
(ii) a relationship between trade and exchange rate volatility that depends on the sign of 
bilateral trade balances, (iii) a positive effect of EU on trade and investment, and (iv) a 
positive effect of EMU on investment and a non-negative effect of EMU on trade. For 
Slovenia, for example, estimates of the effects of EMU on FDI are about 22 percent, those on 
trade about 8 percent. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a discussion of the 
empirical literature on the effects of the early introduction of EMU. Section 3 outlines the 
hypotheses to be tested. This is followed by the empirical tests in Section 4. Section 5 uses 
this evidence to compute the trade and FDI effects of a country-by-country enlargement of 
EMU. Section 6 discusses the consequences of the empirical results together with the scores 
of the ten new EU countries on the basis of the Maastricht criteria. Section 7 concludes. An 
Appendix describes the data methods and sources, and includes panel least square estimates 
with deflated variables. 
 
2. Related Literature 
 
Rose (2000) initiated a new stream in the empirical literature. He uses the gravity equation to 
estimate the separate effects of exchange rate volatility and currency unions on international 
trade. He finds a significant effect on trade for both variables. More specifically, the 
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conclusion is that countries with a common currency would trade three times as much as 
countries that do not share a common currency. Further, bringing down the exchange rate 
volatility hypothetically to zero increases trade by 13 percent. These results led to numerous 
reactions, most of them questioning the large common currency effects on trade. 
 
In his interpretive survey of the literature, Baldwin (2006) mentions the following drawbacks. 
First, a selection bias may arise because the data set used by Rose contains currency unions 
that involve many small and/or developing nations. As the EMU is exclusively built on 
developed countries his findings may not be applicable to Europe's single currency. Second, 
an important endogeneity issue may arise as well. If it were the case that countries that trade 
more with each other tend to form currency unions, then the estimated trade effects of 
currency unions cannot be interpreted as a pure currency union effect. Third, Rose’s 
hypothesis is whether countries with a common currency trade more than countries without. 
For the EMU, the question is different, namely, has the euro caused a structural break in the 
data? Finally, the estimated effects using the gravity equation could suffer from non-linearity 
and omitted variables. 
 
Taking care of most shortcomings of the existing literature, Micco et al. (2003) find more 
realistic effects of a currency union on trade: by joining the EMU, any two participating 
countries may increase their bilateral trade by 5 to 20 percent. In addition, there is the no 
evidence of trade diversion with non-member countries. This is important because potential 
gains for both member and non-member countries generate broad support for a currency 
union like the EMU. 
 
The gravity model is the predominant functional form to infer the effects of institutions like 
regional trading agreements and exchange rate regimes. It is commonly used, mainly because 
it shows a high explanatory power. It is therefore not surprising to observe several attempts to 
develop its theoretical foundation (see Anderson, 1979; Deardorff, 1995; Helpman and 
Krugman, 1985; Bergstrand, 1989; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). For example, the 
insight of Anderson (1979), Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) is to show that trade between 
any two countries, after controlling for size, depends on a multilateral resistance term namely, 
bilateral barriers between them relative to average trade barriers that both countries face with 
the world.  
 
In contrast, there are fewer theoretical foundations for the gravity equation for foreign 
investment flows. For example, Martin and Rey (2004) propose a theory of asset trade from 
which a gravity equation emerges. Testing the model, Portes and Rey (2005) show that it 
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explains international transactions in financial assets with the same explanatory power as 
trade transactions. Regarding FDI, De Sousa and Lochard (2006) derive and test a gravity 
model based on the tradeoff between the benefits of a foreign affiliate of a multinational 
enterprise and the cost of its remoteness. In the model’s reduced form, FDI depends on an 
inward effect, an outward effect (both related to countries’ GDP), a bilateral effect (linguistic 
ties, colonial, physical distance) and a multilateral effect that represents the relative 
attractiveness of alternative locations.  
 
3.  Main Testable Hypotheses 
 
The theoretical literature has derived a number of hypotheses regarding the relationship 
between trade and FDI and the role of exchange rate volatility on trade and investment. Tests 
of these key propositions are important as most effects of EMU enlargement rest on the sign 
and value of these key estimates. These hypotheses are outlined below; the explanatory 
variables used to test each hypothesis are given within parentheses. Expected signs are 
summarized in Table 1. 
 
Significance of EMU (EMU2) 
 
Rose (2004) performs a meta-analysis of all studies that had investigated the effect of a 
currency union on trade till that date, thirty-four in total. He concludes that the hypothesis that 
there is no effect of currency unions on trade can be rejected at conventional significance 
levels. It is therefore safe to assume that the EMU has increased trade. 
 
Though such a meta-analysis is not yet available for FDI, most empirical studies show a 
positive effect. In De Sousa and Lochard (2006) for example, the introduction of the euro 
raises FDI stocks among EMU countries by about 29 percent on average. In Petroulas (2007), 
it is estimated that the EMU increases inward FDI flows by about 16 percent within the euro 
area. There is also evidence of positive spillovers from EMU on partner countries within the 
European Union. Hence, these increases parallel those obtained for trade volumes.3 
                                                 
3 But, what are the reasons for the positive effects? First, the elimination of currency exchange costs is 
an obvious benefit. Also, the increased transparency in the international comparison of prices facilitates 
the arbitrage of goods across national boundaries. Simultaneously, search engines of the internet have 
provided the technology to perform arbitrage more efficiently. Second, the emergence of the euro as a 
reserve currency qualifies it as a prime currency of invoice for trade with non-member countries. For 
the euro zone, this is an additional element of stability as it shifts the exchange rate risk to trade 
partners. Third, with the announcement and introduction of the euro, real returns to capital have 
converged almost completely among participating countries. For countries with historically high 
interest rates, this meant a boost to new investments, higher growth and trade.  
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Table 1 Expected Signs 
 
Explanatory variables Export 
Outward FDI 
Stock 
ln GDP country i + + 
ln GDP country j + + 
   
ln distance - - 
contiguity + +/- 
language  + + 
   
ln FDI (of i in j) +/-  
   
TB*ln volatility -  
ln volatility  +/- 
   
XR change 0  
XR appreciation  - 
XR depreciation  + 
   
EU2 + + 
EU1 +/- +/- 
   
EMU2 + + 
EMU1(new) +/- +/- 
EMU1(ru) +/- +/- 
EMU1(rw) +/- +/- 
 
Significance of EU (EU2) 
 
Several empirical studies have examined the hypothesis that a free trade agreement (FTA) 
increases members’ trade and share of FDI. In a recent study of trade, Baier and Bergstrand 
(2007) use a gravity model and show that a FTA approximately doubles two members’ 
bilateral trade after 10 years. Regarding FDI, it is a matter of empirical research to 
characterize this relationship. Besides that, though there are a number of theoretical studies 
that look at trade diversion (EU1), the empirical studies do not really support the hypothesis 
(see e.g. Bowen et al., 1998, chapter 12). 
 
Trade and FDI: Substitutes or Complements (ln FDI) 
 
Mundell (1957) is credited with the first formal analysis of the interaction between the 
international flow of goods and factors. Adopting the neo-classical model of trade, but 
relaxing the assumption of international factor immobility, Mundell derived the result that an 
increase in trade impediments stimulates factor movements and an increase in restrictions to 
factor movements stimulates trade. More generally, the result states that goods trade and 
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factor flows are substitutes. In contrast, some have searched for explanations for 
complementarity within the context of received trade models. Markusen’s (1983) analysis 
offers one such attempt. 
 
Since alternative theoretical models predict opposite results concerning the relationship 
between the international trade in goods and in factors, it is a matter of empirical research to 
characterize this relationship. Previous research efforts have dealt with this issue but most 
recent studies conclude on a positive correlation between the international flow of goods and 
factors (see e.g. Wong, 1988; Brenton et al., 1999).4  
 
Trade and Conditional Volatility of Exchange Rates (TB* ln volatility) 
 
Fluctuations in foreign currencies matter for foreign investment because of the forward-
looking behavior of multinationals when they make decisions to locate abroad. They matter 
for trade because of the common practice in international trade to extent trade credits. Hence, 
there is a time gap between the delivery date of goods and the payment date. These 
fluctuations give rise to both “level” and “risk” effects.  
 
Regarding risk, theory in this field is rather simple in the sense that there is one main result 
namely, the separation theorem: in the presence of forward markets, the volume of trade is 
independent of the distributions of the exchange rate and of the type of utility function of the 
exporter (Edor and Zilcha, 1991). The implication is that any two firms with the same cost 
function but with different attitudes toward risk, and with different probability beliefs about 
the future exchange rate, will produce the same level of output. This is the important 
contribution of a forward market. If the separation result holds, the exporter avoids exchange 
risk altogether and is indifferent between the EMU or a flexible exchange rate regime.  
 
Several empirical studies have examined the hypothesis that increases in the conditional 
volatility of exchange rates reduce trade. The results differ depending on whether the analysis 
assumes the existence of a well-developed forward market. Studies of developing countries in 
which forward markets are absent generally find a negative relationship between trade and 
exchange rate volatility (Coes, 1981). For countries with forward markets, no consistent link 
between volatility and trade has been found (Klaassen, 2004).  
                                                 
4 For example, Wong (1988) estimates the effects of the movements of capital and labor on the volume 
of trade and factor prices of the United States over the period 1948-83. His results suggest a strong 
complementarity result between factor supplies and international trade. This implies that any increase 
in US factor endowments causes an increase in the volume of US trade (exports and imports) with the 
rest of the world. 
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In an attempt to reconcile the theory with empirics, Viaene and de Vries (1992) relax the 
assumption of exogenous forward rates necessary to derive the separation theorem and solve 
for the forward rate in terms exchange rate volatility whose sign is the negative of the net 
foreign currency exposure of an economy. Since importers and exporters are on opposite 
sides of the forward market, so is their exposure towards conditional exchange rate volatility. 
As gravity models consider both bilateral exports and imports to a single country, they are the 
ideal setup to test this relationship. To that end, we take the bilateral trade balance (TB) as a 
proxy for net aggregate foreign currency exposure and multiply it by the natural logarithm of 
volatility (TB*ln volatility). Assume TB<0. An increase in volatility in this framework leads 
to a depreciation of the home currency, which in turn increases exports. In contrast, when 
TB>0, an increased volatility decreases exports. The expected sign is therefore negative. 
 
FDI and Conditional Volatility of Exchange Rates (ln volatility) 
 
Though there are numerous theoretical studies that look at how the conditional volatility of 
exchange rates affects foreign investment, no separation theorem has been derived for this 
case. For example, Broll and Zilcha (1992) show that in a model of horizontal product 
differentiation the effects of volatility (more precisely, a second-order decrease in the 
distribution of the exchange rate) depend on the shape of the profit function. Another 
interesting result is that in models of vertical product differentiation the reduced form 
expected gain from investment is a strictly convex function of the uncertain exchange rate. 
Therefore, an increase in foreign exchange variability has a positive effect on vertical foreign 
direct investment (Roy and Viaene, 1998). To the extent that strategic control of vertical 
production is an important motive for foreign investment, this last result indicates there is a 
theoretical basis for increased volatility of exchange rates having a positive effect on FDI. 
 
Exchange Rates and Trade (XR change) 
 
A robust result of models of trade and exchange rates is that the terms of trade effect has the 
correct sign and is significant. If the exchange rate is defined as the number of units of 
domestic currency per unit of foreign currency (an increase is a depreciation), the expected 
level of the exchange rate is positively correlated with exports. However, since gravity 
models consider both bilateral exports of country i to country j and of country j to i (imports 
of country i), the sign is expected to be null if trade balances are in equilibrium.  
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Exchange Rates and FDI: Hysteresis (XR depreciation, XR appreciation) 
 
As for the effect of a change in the expected level of exchange rate on direct investment, the 
empirical literature has provided mixed answers. On the one hand, a depreciation of the 
domestic currency can decrease the relative wealth of domestic firms and therefore their 
relative ability to undertake mergers and acquisitions (see Froot and Stein, 1991). In models 
of vertical integration, a depreciation of the investor’s currency increases both the effective 
arms length price at which a unit of the intermediate good can be bought in the market and 
the unit cost of producing the good directly through a subsidiary: the net effect is always a 
reduction in the incentive to undertake FDI. 
 
On the other hand, models on hysteresis like in Dixit (1992) look for possible asymmetries in 
the response to exchange rate movements: exchange rate depreciations are expected to lead to 
entry events in industries whereas exchange rate appreciations do not necessarily lead to exits. 
In order to test for asymmetry in exchange rate changes we split our observations into 
exchange rate appreciations (XR appreciation) and exchange rate depreciations (XR 
depreciation). For hysteresis to hold, the sign of depreciations is expected to be positive and 
significantly different in absolute value of that of appreciations. 
 
4.  Model Specification and Estimates 
 
The objective of this section is to outline the functional forms of the models to be estimated, 
to define the variables of the models, to report and discuss empirical results. 
 
4.1  Functional Forms 
 
In order to formally assess the effects of EMU on trade and FDI flows we use two different 
models that have been fairly used in the empirical literature (Baltagi, 2005). The first model is 
the so-called one-way error component model where a dependent variable ijty is explained by 
a set of K explanatory variables ijtX  and time-invariant unobserved country fixed effects iα  
and jα . Formally, the model is written as: 
(1) ijty = iα  + jα + 'ijtX β + ijtε ,   i,j = 1,…N; i ≠j; t = 1,…T, 
 
where N is the number of countries and T the number of yearly observations. ijtε  is the 
remainder stochastic disturbance with ijtε  ∼ IID(0, σ2). In our framework ijty stands for the 
natural logarithm of exports of country i to country j in the trade equation and the natural 
logarithm of the outward stock of FDI of country i in country j in the FDI equation. 
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Application of the model leads to the estimation of 2N country parameters. The fixed effects 
of exporter country i and importer country j are included to control for time-invariant country-
specific heterogeneity. This model is used in cross-section regressions of the gravity model 
derived by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) that includes “multilateral resistance” terms 
capturing country i’s and country j’s resistance to trade with all regions. Since multilateral 
resistance terms are not observables, Feenstra (2002) shows that consistent estimates of the 
model can be obtained by using exporter and importer fixed effects. The same logic is applied 
to the FDI specification to proxy a multilateral effect that represents the relative attractiveness 
of alternative investment locations.  
 
An alternative specification of the one-way error component model is the bilateral fixed 
effects model where iα  and jα  in (1) are replaced by time-invariant unobserved country pair 
effects ijα : 
(2) ijty = ijα  + 'ijtX β  + ijtε ,    i,j = 1,…N; i ≠j; t = 1,…,.T. 
 
The estimation of (2) involves estimating N(N-1) country pair parameters ijα . Bilateral fixed 
effects between countries i and j are included to control for influences to the trade and 
investment of a country pair. Border transactions, seasonal trade, investment preferences, 
bilateral treaties, etc. are controlled for with these time-invariant specific effects. Micco et al. 
(2003), Flam and Nordström (2003) have used such a specification. 
 
The second model is the two-way error component model that accounts for any time-specific 
effect that is not included in the regression: 
(3) ijty = iα  + jα + tλ + 'ijtX β  + ijtε ,  i,j = 1,…N; i ≠j; t = 1,…T, 
 
where tλ denotes the unobservable time effect. There are T such time effects. This model 
controls for omitted variables that vary over time but remain constant across countries. 
Likewise, the counterpart of (2) with unobservable time effects is: 
 
(4) ijty = ijα  + tλ + 'ijtX β  + ijtε ,    i,j = 1,…N; i ≠j; t = 1,…,.T. 
 
However, in panel data regressions, an alternative specification of (4) is also used: 
 
(5) ijty = itα  + jtα + 'ijtX β  + ijtε ,   i,j = 1,…N; i ≠j; t = 1,…T, 
 
where the country fixed effects are now made time dependent. Equation (5) includes 2NT 
dummies in the regression. It is unusual to estimate time dependent country pair effects in (5) 
 11
since the specification includes N(N-1)T dummies and its estimation suffers from a too large 
loss of degrees of freedom. 
 
4.2 Definition of Variables 
 
As in Flam and Nordström (2003), the dependent variable in the export equation is the natural 
log of bilateral export flows from country i to country j.5 For FDI it is the natural log of the 
stock of outward FDI from country i in country j. Here, the concept of stocks is preferred to 
flows as they are more persistent through time. As in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), 
Portes and Rey (2005) dependent variables are expressed in nominal terms: 
 
ln export = log of nominal bilateral exports from country i to country j in US $; 
 ln FDI = log of nominal outward FDI stock of country i in country j in US $. 
 
To assess the direct effects of EMU on trade and FDI the K explanatory variables Xijt include 
a number of time-varying binary variables that are meant to measure the potential benefits of 
EMU: 
EMU2 = 1 when country i and j are both EMU members at date t; = 0 otherwise; 
 
EMU1(new) = 1 when country i is EMU member, country j is outside the EMU but 
belongs to the new “ten” at date t; = 0 otherwise; 
 
EMU1(ru) = 1 when country i is EMU member, country j is either Denmark, Sweden, 
U.K at date t; = 0 otherwise; 
 
EMU1(rw) = 1 when country i is EMU member, country j is outside EMU and EU at 
date t; = 0 otherwise; 
 
EU2 = 1 when country i and j are both EU members at date t; = 0 otherwise; 
 
EU1 = 1 when country i only is EU member at date t; = 0 otherwise. 
 
The dummy variables EMU2 and EU2 are introduced separately as they represent two 
separate forms of economic integration: the first one, a first variable of interest, is an estimate 
of the marginal contribution of EMU for participating countries whereas the second is an 
estimate of the marginal contribution of EU for member countries. All other dummies are 
introduced to estimate the extent of trade diversion and the extent of FDI diversion for 
                                                 
5 It is more common to take the average of the logs of export and import. However, using unilateral 
trade flows eases the interpretation of home and partner effects. 
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different country groupings.6 Year of EU entry and/or EMU entry of each country is given in 
the Appendix. 
 
As EMU enlargement means replacing several fluctuating currencies by a common currency 
the “level” and “risk” effects of exchange rates are important. Exchange rates are defined as 
the number of units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency. Hence, the bilateral 
exchange rate is expressed as the number of units of exporter’s currency per unit of importer’s 
currency. Changes are expressed in percentage changes. Volatility is measured as the standard 
deviation of the monthly percentage changes within a year. In particular: 
 
ln volatility = log of exchange rate volatility, where volatility is defined as the 
standard deviation of the monthly percentage changes in the real exchange rate within 
a year; 
 
TB* ln volatility = bilateral trade balance times ln volatility; TB is log bilateral 
exports minus log bilateral imports.  
 
XR change = exchange rate change, measured as the percentage change in the level of 
the exchange rate within a year; 
 
XR depreciation = positive percentage changes in the level of the exchange rate; 
 
XR appreciation = negative percentage changes in the level of the exchange rate. 
 
As bilateral trade depends on market size, we use nominal GDP as a proxy for size in source 
and destination country in the trade equation. Likewise in the FDI equation: 
 
ln GDPi = log of nominal GDP in US $ of country i ; 
ln GDPj = log of nominal GDP in US $ of country j. 
 
Our gravity equations include also standard gravity variables like distance, contiguity, and 
language: 
                                                 
6 In the case of trade, for example, trade diversion is traditionally the amount of trade diverted by a free 
trade area when imports from a non-member country are replaced by imports from a partner country. 
Applied to the context of the EMU, trade diversion occurs if trade with non-EMU countries decreases 
namely, a significant negative sign is obtained for the EMU1 variables. A significant positive sign is 
indicative of external trade creation.  
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ln distance = log of distance between capital cities of country i and j in kilometer; 
contiguity = 1 when countries i and j share a common border; = 0 otherwise; 
language = 1 when countries i and j share a common official language; = 0 otherwise. 
 
These variables are usually not included in specifications with country pair fixed effects as 
they characterize bilateral transactions among source and destination countries. Otherwise, 
distance is a measure of transport costs in physical trade, and in investment decisions it is a 
proxy for costs in information transmission within multinationals.  
 
The above set of explanatory variables gives rise to a sample with the broadest coverage, i.e., 
one that includes the internal market programme and the introduction of the euro. Variables 
that have been found to be significant in prior empirical investigations, like equity market 
capitalization (Portes and Rey, 2005), the stock market indices and payoffs of investment 
(Petroulas, 2007) have not been included, usually because of too few observations if they 
exist. The inclusion of other variables like income per capita and real wages, that are largely 
available, did not lead to conclusive results. 
 
4.3. Empirical Results 
 
We use panel data to estimate equations (1) to (5). Our sample contains 29 countries (N =29): 
all 25 countries that were EU member in 2004 and a control group that consists of 
Switzerland, Japan, Canada, and the United States. This gives 28 bilateral relationships per 
country over a period ranging from 1990 till 2004 and, in principle, a balanced dataset of 
12180 observations. However, because of missing observations this dataset is unbalanced. 
Unilateral data on exports are obtained from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. For FDI 
we use the outward stocks as published by the OECD. The limited availability of FDI data is 
the constraining factor since it limits the time span to fifteen years (T=15). Moreover it has a 
missing rate of approximately fifty percent. The Appendix provides more details regarding 
data methods and sources. 
 
This section reports regression estimates of the models in value terms. Using panel data, 
special attention will therefore be given to the time dummies. For the sake of comparison the 
Appendix reproduces some of our results using deflated variables instead but differences are 
negligible. 
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Estimation results of equations (1) to (4), performed using panel least squares of Eviews 5.0, 
are reported in Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5. Estimates of equation (5) are not reproduced as they show 
almost no concordance with expected signs of Table 1. The difficulty with this model lies in 
the estimation of about 870 dummies that give rise to numerous data problems. In particular, 
too few observations on some country pairs prevent the estimation of some dummy variables7. 
In each table the first part reports the results for export and the second part the results for FDI. 
Across the four model specifications, we have a number of robust and significant parameter 
estimates. For example, it is clear that EMU has a positive effect on FDI. Less robust is the 
effect on trade since EMU2 has only a significant positive sign for exports in Tables 3 and 5 
where country pair fixed effects are used. The sign of volatility on trade is consistently 
negative and significant. Regarding the EU2 dummy, the effects are systematically positive, 
which is indicative of the beneficial effects of EU for trade and investment. Another robust 
finding is the absence of trade and investment diversion for the ten new EU member states. 
This is seen from the estimates of the EMU1(new) dummy, which is non-negative throughout. 
Since estimates of EMU1(new) are often larger than those of EMU2, they probably also 
capture the transition effects of the new EU countries, as they moved from a closed to an open 
economy. Also, FDI is negatively related to exchange rate depreciations (though not always 
significant), a result which does not support the hysteresis hypothesis. The sign of distance is 
negative for trade and investment, which suggests that in the latter case it captures the cost of 
information transmission within international firms.  
 
                                                 
7 Given the forward-looking behaviour of traders and investors, we estimate two separate versions of 
(1) to (5), one with current volatilities, another with expected volatilities. As a proxy for the latter, we 
use one-period ahead volatilities (at date t+1). It turns out that there is almost no difference in the 
outcomes, the reason being that volatilities constructed on a yearly basis show strong persistence 
through time. Hence, we only report results with current volatilities. 
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    Table 2 Country Fixed Effects 
 
Equation (1) 
ln export ln FDI 
Explanatory 
variables 
         (1)                                (2)         (3)                                (4) 
ln GDPi  0.353 (0.000)    1.135 (0.000)  
ln GDPj  0.415 (0.000)    1.421 (0.000)  
     
ln distance  - 0.714 (0.000)  - 0.676 (0.000) - 0.963 (0.000)  - 0.908 (0.000) 
contiguity  0.396 (0.000)  0.398 (0.000)   0.294 (0.003)  0.331 (0.001) 
language  0.218 (0.000)  0.202 (0.000)   0.341 (0.001)  0.337 (0.001) 
    
ln FDI  0.159 (0.000)  0.184 (0.000)  
    
TB* ln volatility  - 0.084 (0.000)  - 0.082 (0.000) 
 
 
ln volatility     0.106 (0.006)  0.064 (0.110) 
     
XR change  - 0.015 (0.134) - 0.011 (0.268)   
XR appreciation     0.049 (0.202)  0.046 (0.251) 
XR depreciation   - 0.060 (0.180)  - 0.051 (0.279) 
     
EU2  0.106 (0.013)  0.266 (0.000)   0.433 (0.000)  1.001 (0.000) 
EU1   - 0.060 (0.193)  0.058 (0.214) - 0.071 (0.587)  0.325 (0.016) 
     
EMU2  0.055 (0.090)  0.114 (0.001)   0.737 (0.000)  0.969 (0.000) 
EMU1(new)  0.115 (0.001)  0.196 (0.000)   0.651 (0.000)  0.966 (0.000) 
EMU1(ru)  0.035 (0.489)  0.093 (0.075)   0.528 (0.000)  0.740 (0.000) 
EMU1(rw)  - 0.054 (0.221)  0.040 (0.382)   0.241 (0.072)  0.666 (0.000) 
     
2R  (adjusted)  
2R  (adj, within)  
 
   0.934  
   0.703 
   0.931 
   0.687 
    0.821 
    0.314 
   0.804 
   0.250 
 
Notes: (i) panel least squares with country dummies; (ii) p-values in parentheses; (iii) No. of 
observations in columns (1) and (2) = 4152; (iv) No. of observations in columns (3) and (4) = 
3542, as we impose FDI > 0.01; (v) within 2R is computed on demeaned data. 
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Table 3 Country Pair Fixed Effects 
 
Equation (2) Explanatory 
variables ln export ln FDI 
 (1) (2) 
ln GDPi   0.480 (0.000) 1.413 (0.000) 
ln GDPj   0.568 (0.000) 1.245 (0.000) 
   
ln FDI   0.033 (0.000)  
   
TB* ln volatility - 0.060 (0.000)  
ln volatility    - 0.061 (0.013) 
   
XR change   0.010 (0.017)  
XR appreciation  0.095 (0.025) 
XR depreciation    - 0.014 (0.676) 
   
EU2   0.129 (0.000) 0.237 (0.001) 
EU1    0.074 (0.001)   - 0.129 (0.134) 
   
EMU2    0.144 (0.000) 0.569 (0.000) 
EMU1(new)   0.383 (0.000) 1.222 (0.000) 
EMU1(ru)   0.046 (0.047) 0.806 (0.000) 
EMU1(rw)   0.117 (0.000) 0.437 (0.000) 
   
Constant   0.786 (0.000)   - 9.927 (0.000) 
2R  (adjusted) 
2R  (adj, within) 
 
     0.991 
     0.640 
    0.946 
    0.428 
 
Notes: (i) panel least squares with country pair dummies; (ii) p-values in parentheses; (iii) No. 
of observations in column (1) = 4152; (iv) No. of observations in column (2) = 3542, as we 
impose FDI > 0.01; (v) within 2R is computed on demeaned data. 
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Table 4 Country Fixed Effects and Time-specific Effects 
 
Equation (3) 
ln export ln FDI 
Explanatory 
variables 
(1)  (2) (3)  (4) 
ln GDPi 0.426 (0.000)  0.922 (0.001)  
ln GDPj 0.461 (0.000)  1.230 (0.000)  
     
ln distance  - 0.714 (0.000) - 0.704 (0.000)  - 0.964 (0.000) - 0.954 (0.000) 
contiguity 0.398 (0.000)   0.408 (0.000) 0.300 (0.002)   0.331 (0.001) 
language 0.218 (0.000)   0.208 (0.000) 0.342 (0.001)   0.331 (0.001) 
     
ln FDI 0.158 (0.000)   0.163 (0.000)   
     
TB* ln volatility  - 0.085 (0.000) - 0.084 (0.000)   
ln volatility   0.144 (0.000)   0.162 (0.000) 
     
XR change  - 0.009 (0.403) - 0.002 (0.864)   
XR appreciation   0.054 (0.159)   0.062 (0.111) 
XR depreciation    - 0.067 (0.131) - 0.068 (0.132) 
     
EU2 0.100 (0.026)   0.104 (0.023) 0.470 (0.003)   0.480 (0.000) 
EU1   - 0.063 (0.183) - 0.060 (0.208)  - 0.059 (0.659) - 0.062 (0.650) 
     
EMU2 0.012 (0.763) - 0.023 (0.538) 0.410 (0.000)        0.338 (0.002) 
EMU1(new) 0.063 (0.176)   0.055 (0.229) 0.329 (0.010)   0.327 (0.010) 
EMU1(ru)  - 0.011 (0.836) - 0.055 (0.320) 0.164 (0.293)   0.044 (0.778) 
EMU1(rw)  - 0.102 (0.039) - 0.144 (0.004)  - 0.109 (0.456) - 0.201 (0.170) 
   
2R  (adjusted)  
2R  (adj, within)  
 
    0.935                         0.934 
    0.691                         0.686  
    0.824                        0.821 
    0.236                        0.225 
   
Notes: (i) panel least squares with country and year dummies; (ii) p-values in parentheses; 
(iii) No. of observations in columns (1) and (2) = 4152; (iv) No. of observations in columns 
(3) and (4) = 3542, as we impose FDI > 0.01; (v) within 2R is computed on demeaned and 
detrended data. 
 
. 
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Table 5 Country Pair Fixed Effects and Time-specific Effects 
 
Equation (4) Explanatory 
variables ln export ln FDI 
 (1) (2) 
ln GDPi 0.522 (0.000) 1.193 (0.000) 
ln GDPj 0.590 (0.000) 1.060 (0.000) 
   
ln FDI 0.020 (0.000)  
   
TB* ln volatility   - 0.063 (0.000)  
ln volatility    - 0.019 (0.437) 
   
XR change 0.016 (0.000)  
XR appreciation  0.100 (0.015) 
XR depreciation    - 0.027 (0.388) 
   
EU2 0.127 (0.000) 0.252 (0.001) 
EU1  0.069 (0.001)   - 0.102 (0.228) 
   
EMU2 0.067 (0.000) 0.192 (0.003) 
EMU1(new) 0.305 (0.000) 0.830 (0.000) 
EMU1(ru)   - 0.032 (0.178) 0.419 (0.000) 
EMU1(rw) 0.032 (0.130) 0.037 (0.678) 
   
Constant 0.476 (0.112)   - 7.178 (0.000) 
2R  (adjusted) 
2R  (adj, within) 
 
    0.992 
    0.337 
    0.950 
    0.085 
 
Notes: (i) panel least squares with country pair and year dummies; (ii) p-values in 
parentheses; (iii) No. of observations in column (1) = 4152; (iv) No. of observations in 
column (2) = 3542, as we impose FDI > 0.01; (v) within 2R is computed on demeaned and 
detrended data. 
 
 
Finally, a crucial result of our empirical analysis is that the link between FDI and trade is 
positive and significant. This implies that the euro affects trade through two channels: (i) a 
direct effect due to the microeconomic benefits of a common currency and (ii) an indirect 
effect due to its stimulating effects on FDI.  
 
These last results are consistent with the idea that industrial production can be more efficient 
if it splits into separate stages. Various stages need not be located in the same country if it is 
easy to ship products from place to place. Participation to EMU is a potential contributor to 
this international division of labor by lowering uncertainty and making markets more 
transparent. Competing firms in the same market tend also to invest upstream in a particular 
region because rival firms do. A typical outcome is that the decrease in the fixed cost of 
investment brought about by the EMU (because of lower transaction costs, lower interest 
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rates, etc.) can trigger a jump in the volume of foreign investment. Trade with these regions 
increases as well and takes the form of intra-firm trade.8 
 
Given this let us now select the estimated equations to be used later in our simulation 
experiments. To that end we perform likelihood ratio tests of specification in Tables 6, 7 and 
8. Based on Table 6 we reject the null hypothesis that the effects of GDPi and GDPj are null. 
This is also supported by the individual p-values in Tables 2 and 4. The contribution of both 
variables in the trade and investment equations is significant at any conventional significance 
level. Likewise in Table 7, we reject the null hypothesis that the time-specific fixed effects are 
null. They are significant at any conventional significance level as well. Hence, we can 
conclude that the best models are those of Table 4 (columns 1 and 3) and of Table 5. 
 
Table 6 Likelihood Ratio Tests of the Inclusion of GDP 
 
Export FDI  
Table 2 Table 4 Table 2 Table 4 
H0     col. 2     col. 2     col. 4     col. 4 
     
H1     col. 1     col. 1     col. 3     col. 3 
     
LR test   226.560  67.562    323.632 53.532 
     
Degrees of freedom     2     2      2     2 
     
p-value     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
     
 
 
                                                 
8 This is weak evidence in favour of vertical motivations for FDI. Stronger evidence could be obtained 
by testing a knowledge-capital model like in Carr et al. (2001) and Bloningen et al. (2003) that 
combines both horizontal and vertical arguments for FDI. Though the knowledge-capital model is not 
tested here, it lends itself to an interpretation of EMU enlargement. In the model, firms with horizontal 
FDI set up plants close to final demand and are influenced in their decisions by trade costs and market 
size. In contrast, firms with vertical FDI carry out unskilled-labor production in locations with 
relatively high endowments in unskilled labor. When countries join the EMU trade costs with member 
countries are expected to decrease. This gives more incentive for vertically integrated firms to expand 
and ship their goods across locations and less incentive for horizontally integrated firms to “jump” into 
the euro area, build a plant and sell their products directly. The net effect is an empirical question and 
our empirical results support the idea that vertical FDI dominates horizontal FDI. 
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Table 7 Likelihood Ratio Tests of the Significance of Time-specific Effects 
 
 Export FDI 
H0 Eq. (1) Eq. (2)  Eq. (1) Eq. (2) 
     
H1 Eq. (3) Eq. (4) Eq. (3) Eq. (4) 
     
LR test 50.432 60.414  382.536 277.53 
     
Degrees of freedom     14     14     14     14 
     
p-value     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
     
 
 
Table 8 Likelihood Ratio Tests of Fixed Effects 
 
 
 
Export 
 
FDI 
H0 Eq. (3) Eq. (3) 
   
H1 Eq. (4) Eq. (4) 
   
LR test  8631.19  4919.64 
   
Degrees of freedom   545   545 
   
p-value   0.000   0.000 
 
 
Finally, like in Baltagi et al. (2003), we report the likelihood ratio tests that discern between 
these two models in Table 8. It is clear that we can reject the null hypothesis that equation (3) 
is the true model. Equation (4) is preferred as the contribution of country pair fixed effects 
(together with time-specific fixed effects) is significant at any conventional significance 
level.9 
 
5. EMU Enlargement 
 
The effects of EMU enlargement for each individual country can be approximated using a 
simulation-based technique that involves the following three steps: 
                                                 
9 The GDP variables are usually subsumed in fixed effects in cross-section analyzes. However, in our 
framework with panel data, tests of Table 6 support their inclusion. To further characterize their role in 
our preferred equation (4), F-tests and Wald-tests imply the following at any conventional significance 
level: (i) rejection of the homogeneity of degree 1 in the export equation; (ii) failure to reject 
homogeneity of degree 1 in the FDI equation; (iii) rejection of the null hypothesis that estimates of 
GDPs in the export equation are different; (iv) rejection of the null hypothesis that estimates of GDPs 
in the FDI equation are different. 
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Step 1: to simulate our estimated models to obtain the value of trade and FDI that 
arises in absence of EMU enlargement. This is our base scenario.10 
 
Step 2: to compute the counterfactual, that is, to compute the amount of trade and FDI 
that would arise if each of the ten new EU members had joined the euro zone in 2004, 
one by one. This is the counterfactual scenario. 
 
Step 3: to compute percentage differences between the counterfactual and the base 
scenario. This gives our estimates of EMU enlargement. 
 
These steps are reproduced for each of the ten possible entrants and results are shown in 
Table 9. 
Table 9 Effects of EMU Enlargement: Model with Country Pair and 
Time-specific Fixed Effects 
 
 FDI  Export  
Countries EMU Exchange rate  EMU Exchange rate Indirect  
  effect Volatility Change Total effect TB*V Change FDI Total 
Cyprus 21.17 0.03 2.41 23.61 6.93 0.02 0.19 0.48 7.62 
Czech R. 21.17 0.61 -0.04 21.74 6.93 -0.02 0.65 0.44 8.00 
Estonia 21.17 0.09 0.29 21.55 6.93 0.05 0.12 0.44 7.54 
Hungary 21.17 7.47 1.68 30.32 6.93 -2.51 2.41 0.61 7.44 
Latvia 21.17 0.04 -1.89 19.32 6.93 -0.02 0.68 0.39 7.98 
Lithuania 21.17 0.02 1.11 22.30 6.93 0.00 -6.55 0.45 0.83 
Malta 21.17 0.11 -2.30 18.98 6.93 0.02 5.97 0.38 13.30 
Poland 21.17 0.28 -2.95 18.50 6.93 -0.04 3.46 0.37 10.72 
Slovakia 21.17 0.59 2.02 23.78 6.93 0.19 0.38 0.48 7.98 
Slovenia 21.17 1.19 -0.79 21.57 6.93 0.37 0.13 0.44 7.87 
Notes: (a). All numbers are percentage changes with respect to the base scenario, that is, data 
obtained from the static simulation of estimated equations. We are considering a country by 
country enlargement; (b) For FDI the cells are obtained as follows: column EMU effect = 
setting EMU2 at 1; column volatility = volatility with third countries is now that of the euro 
and volatility with the euro is set at zero (as ln 0 =-∞ we set estimated parameters of ln 
volatility and of TB* ln volatility equal to zero); column Change = setting exchange rate 
changes with the euro at zero; total= sum of all previous columns; (c) Likewise for exports 
except: column Indirect FDI = product of column (4) times elasticity of FDI in export 
equation. 
 
Intuitively, the implementation of EMU for a candidate country means replacing a (managed) 
floating exchange rate regime by a common currency. Hence, a counterfactual scenario 
consists of bringing three major changes in our data. First, the true significance of the euro is 
obtained by setting the binary variable EMU2 to 1. It is important to note that EMU1(new) is 
not set to zero because this coefficient probably also captures transition effects on trade and 
                                                 
10 Base scenario is the solution of our model before the change to EMU without carrying over the 
estimation residuals. 
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investment. Second, volatility with third countries becomes that of the euro. Also the bilateral 
exchange rate volatility with the euro should be set to zero. However, as ln 0 =-∞ it is similar 
to set the estimated parameters of ln volatility and of TB* ln volatility equal to zero. Third, 
the currency takes its central parity rate whereby exchange rate changes become null. For 
trade, a fourth effect is added which corresponds to the change in trade that is induced by its 
positive relationship with FDI.  
 
Results in Table 9 are based on estimates of Table 5. The direct FDI effect of EMU in Table 9 
can be approximated by (e0.192 -1)∗100 ≈ 21.17%.11 Whereas this effect is common to all 
potential entrants, cross-country variations in the results emerge from exchange rate 
movements in 2004. Since exchange rate volatility has a negative effect on FDI, bringing 
down to zero the exchange rate volatility with the euro has a positive effect on FDI. The 
larger the observed volatility in 2004 is the larger the potential gain of volatility reduction. 
This is definitely the case for Hungary that experienced the largest exchange rate volatility 
among the new ten EU members. Changes in the level of the exchange rates are differentiated 
in both sign and absolute value. The direct export effect of EMU is (e0.067-1)∗100 ≈ 6.93% and 
is also common to all countries. Compared to FDI, other effects on trade differ in two 
respects. First, the volatility effect on trade depends also on the sign of the trade balance. 
Second, there is the induced effect of FDI on exports. In total, trade effects vary between 
0.84% for Lithuania to 13.3% for Malta. Some of these effects arise from the 
complementarity with FDI. A reason for the unusually weak elasticity of FDI in the trade 
equation might be that most cross-country variations are picked up by the country-pair binary 
variables.  
 
6. Candidate Countries? 
 
Besides the importance of trade and foreign investment, membership to EMU would imply 
the loss of the macroeconomic flexibility of running an independent monetary policy. For that 
reason, candidate EMU countries have to satisfy Maastricht criteria in order to minimize the 
macroeconomic costs of a common monetary policy: 
                                                 
11 In order to conduct a comparative static exercise, such as asking what the effects are of switching to 
a new exchange rate regime, three techniques are currently available to estimate the true effects of 
these institutional changes: a difference-in-differences approach, a general equilibrium analysis and a 
simulation-based analysis of a counterfactual scenario using mean estimates of a model. The multi-
dimensional issues of EMU enlargement are too complex to be analyzed in a general equilibrium 
setting like in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). In contrast true effects can be approximated using 
the counterfactual analysis that is more general than the difference-in-differences approach. As a matter 
of fact the difference-in-differences estimates of EMU are given by columns “EMU effect” of Table 9. 
These effects are common to all countries. 
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• an inflation no more than 1.5 percentage points above the average of the three 
countries with the lowest inflation rates; 
 
• nominal long-term interest rates not exceeding by more than 2 percentage points 
those of the three countries with the lowest inflation rates; 
 
• no exchange rate realignment for at least two years; 
• a gross debt to GDP ratio that does not exceed 60 percent; 
• a government budget deficit not in excess of 3 percent of each country’s GDP. 
 
The first three criteria are designed to cover the loss of an independent monetary policy. The 
last two restrictions on government budgets are in place to protect the EMU from threats of 
inflation and to avoid the displacement of economic activity through fiscal policies. Though 
the last criterion has been broken recently by a number of current EMU members, it remains a 
tight constraint for potential entrants. 
 
Table 10 Scores on Maastricht Criteriaa 
 
Inflation 
(HICP) 
Budget 
deficit to 
GDP 
Government 
debt to GDP
Exchange 
rate 
Long term 
interest 
rate 
Criteria 
satisfied?
           Criteria 
 
Countries 
2.9 -3 60 ERM2 b 5.8 yes/no  
Cyprus 1.5 -1.5 65.3 + 4.3 no 
Czech Republic 1.5 -2.9 30.4 - 3.7 no 
Estonia 5.1 3.8 4.1 + 4.7 no 
Hungary 6.6 -9.2 66.0 - 6.8 no 
Latvia 6.8 0.4 10.0 + 4.9 no 
Lithuania 6.0 -0.3 18.2 + 4.3 no 
Malta 0.8 -2.6 66.5 + 4.3 no 
Poland 1.4 -3.9 47.8 - 5.1 no 
Slovakia 3.7 -3.4 30.7 + 4.2 no 
Slovenia 3.0 -1.4 27.8 + 3.9 no 
 
Notes: (a) Own compilations from Eurostat data (December 2006). Bold figures indicate when a 
given criterion is satisfied; (b) “+” in the column ERM2 indicates participation to ERM2; “-“no 
participation to ERM2. Participation means that a central parity rate against the euro is set for the 
currency and the currency may then fluctuate by a certain percentage relative to the central parity 
rate. 
 
Table 10 shows how the 10 countries that joined the EU in 2004 performed on each of the 
five criteria. It is clear that none of the ten met the euro-adoption criteria at the end of 
December 2006. Though Cyprus, Czech Republic, Malta and Slovenia were strong 
performers, each failed to achieve one criterion in the table, sometimes by a small margin 
(like Slovenia that adopted the euro on Jan 1, 2007). In contrast, Hungary met none of the 
criteria. Other countries faced fiscal problems or had too high inflation rates.  
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Regardless of Maastricht criteria, all countries of our analysis emerge as potential gainers in 
terms of foreign trade and investment. The reason is that besides the true significance of EMU 
exchange rates matter as well. We have shown that for most countries effects of exchange rate 
changes reinforce EMU effects. Therefore, based on our analysis, countries that almost meet 
Maastricht criteria (other than Slovenia) could be equally admitted to the EMU.  
 
7. Conclusion  
 
This paper has considered the nature and the distribution of trade and FDI effects of a 
potential enlargement of the European Monetary Union (EMU) to the ten countries that 
obtained EU membership in 2004. The above analysis provides evidence that EMU 
enlargement to the ten new EU countries can generate positive effects on the amount of FDI 
they are expected to receive. The evidence on trade is positive as well. Some of the trade 
effects arise from higher FDI stocks as our empirical results support the hypothesis of a 
positive correlation between trade and FDI. 
 
Our framework includes some specific assumptions and, though numerous checks were 
performed, results are still subject to the issue of robustness. First, in order to conduct a 
comparative static exercise, such as asking what the effects are of switching to a new 
exchange rate regime, one should solve a general equilibrium model before and after the 
change. Since our analysis ignores price and income effects of EMU enlargement it is an 
approximation of its true effects. However, as income is supposed to rise and inflationary 
expectations to decrease with EMU, our results could be interpreted as lower bounds. Second, 
the numerous cells with zeroes in our panel data caused problems in the estimation of our 
models. Though this is an old issue in gravity models of trade, for which solutions are now 
available (see e.g. Helpman et al., 2007), the new difficulty lied in the FDI data. Zero 
reported stocks could point out measurement problems or high setup costs of new foreign 
investment (see e.g. Razin et al., 2004). Our solution was to exclude observations that were 
lower than a specific bound but other methods could be explored. Third, our empirical 
analysis had difficulties in distinguishing between the true effects of the early introduction of 
the euro and those resulting from the transition from closed to open economies. The ten new 
EU members are still in an evolution phase and our estimated coefficients probably capture 
this changeover. More empirical work should be able to clarify the relative contribution of 
each. However, it is hoped that the analysis presented here offers a convenient framework 
within which further research on such issues can be conducted. 
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Appendix 
A. Data Sources and Methods 
Unilateral data on export are obtained from the Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) 
published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Annual averages of FOB exports are 
used for the period 1980-2005. The values are measured in United States dollars (US $); 
conversion to US $ is done by using year to year exchange rates. 
 
FDI data are taken from the International Direct Investment by Country Table (2005, release 
01), which has been put together by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). The data set contains annual averages of the outward FDI stock for 
the period 1990-2004. The values are measured in US $.  
 
The real exchange rates are taken from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. Monthly 
averages are used for the period 1980.01 until 2006.11. Changes are expressed in percentage 
changes.  
 
The gravity variables, distance, contiguity, and language, are taken from Centre d’Etudes 
Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (www.cepii.fr). 
 
Nominal GDP is obtained from the IMF, International Financial Statistics.  
 
The country groupings are as follows. EMU = Austria, Belgium, France, Finland, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Year of EMU entry 
for these countries is 1999, except for Greece that joined in 2001; NEW= Estonia, Hungary, 
Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus, Poland, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia. These 
countries joined the EU in 2004; RU = Denmark, Sweden, U.K.; RW = Canada, Japan, 
Switzerland and U.S. The EU consists of 25 countries, all countries in our sample except RW. 
Year of EU entry for Austria, Finland and Sweden is 1995. 
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B. Least Square Estimates with Deflated Variables 
For the sake of comparison Table 11 gives the results of estimation in real terms. The 
specification is similar to that of Table 2. The difference is in the definition of variables: Xij, 
GDPi and FDIij are deflated by the GDP deflator of country i; GDPj by the GDP deflator of 
country j. From Tables 2 and 11 it is clear that signs and estimates of key variables are 
comparable. 
Table 11 Country Fixed Effects with Deflated Variables 
 
Equation (1) 
ln export ln FDI 
Explanatory 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln GDPi 0.591 (0.000)  1.573 (0.000)  
ln GDPj 0.311 (0.000)  2.030 (0.000)  
     
ln distance - 0.717 (0.000) - 0.691 (0.000) - 0.961 (0.000) - 0.908 (0.000) 
contiguity 0.399 (0.000)   0.401 (0.000)  0.276 (0.004)  0.330 (0.001) 
language 0.216 (0.000)   0.208 (0.000)  0.338 (0.001)  0.336 (0.001) 
     
ln FDI 0.155 (0.000)   0.174 (0.000)   
     
TB* ln volatility - 0.086 (0.010) - 0.084 (0.000)   
ln volatility    0.111(0.003)  0.083 (0.037) 
     
XR change - 0.026 (0.010) - 0.013 (0.217)   
XR appreciation    0.043 (0.252)  0.049 (0.219) 
XR depreciation   - 0.050 (0.258) - 0.052 (0.262) 
     
EU2 0.094 (0.027)   0.193 (0.000)  0.424 (0.000)  0.927 (0.000) 
EU1 - 0.064 (0.160)   0.011 (0.807) - 0.089 (0.484)  0.280 (0.036) 
     
EMU2 0.063 (0.062)   0.157 (0.000)  0.565 (0.000)  1.030 (0.000) 
EMU1(new) 0.108 (0.013)   0.245 (0.000)  0.230 (0.051)  1.023 (0.000) 
EMU1(ru) 0.044 (0.396)   0.138 (0.008)  0.379 (0.008)  0.798 (0.000) 
EMU1(rw) - 0.038 (0.409)   0.060 (0.185)  0.241 (0.073)  0.669 (0.000) 
     
2R  (adjusted) 
2R  (adj, within) 
  0.924 
  0.699 
  0.921 
  0.691 
  0.756 
  0.333 
  0.727 
  0.255 
   
Notes: (i) panel least squares with country pair dummies; (ii) p-values in parentheses; (iii) No. 
of observations in columns (1) and (2) = 4152; (iv) No. of observations in columns (3) and (4) 
= 3542, as we impose FDI > 0.01; (v) within 2R is computed on demeaned data. 
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